

APPEAL NO. 030756  
FILED MAY 5, 2003

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on December 18, 2002. The record closed on February 19, 2003. With respect to the single issue before her, the hearing officer determined that the appellant (claimant) did not sustain a compensable occupational disease injury with a date of \_\_\_\_\_. In her appeal, the claimant argues that the hearing officer's injury determination is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant's appeal, the respondent (carrier) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant did not sustain a compensable occupational disease injury with a date of \_\_\_\_\_. The claimant had the burden of proof on that issue. Johnson v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 351 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1961, no writ). The injury issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer to resolve. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence and of its weight and credibility. Section 410.165(a). The hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and decides what facts the evidence has established. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision we will reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986).

In this instance, there was conflicting evidence on the issue of nature and duration of the typing that the claimant was required to perform in her job as an office manager at a funeral home. The hearing officer determined that the credible evidence did not establish that the claimant sustained a compensable injury. The hearing officer simply was not persuaded that the claimant sustained her burden of proving that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by repetitively traumatic activities the claimant performed at the funeral home. The hearing officer was acting within her province as the fact finder in so finding. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the challenged determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust; therefore, no sound basis exists for us to reverse the injury determination on appeal. Pool, *supra*; Cain, *supra*.

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY  
800 BRAZOS  
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701.**

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Elaine M. Chaney  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Judy L. S. Barnes  
Appeals Judge

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Veronica Lopez  
Appeals Judge